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case. Here the court strongly reaffirmed the requirement of demonstrable
injury in fact, finding that the facts of this case established the standing
requirement of personal injury.64 Collusive suits are somewhat unavoidable
due to successful plaintiff-shopping by public interest groups such as the ACLU
and the Sierra Club. The instant decision will at least force such groups to
limit their role to supporting properly injured plaintiffs.6 5
The instant case partially clarifies the standing doctrine for establishment
clause claims by demonstrating the requisite degree of personal interest and
injury that plaintiffs must allege. The decision is the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals' first application of the Supreme Court's Valley Forge holding.
Unlike the Valley Forge majority, the instant court has made a notable resolution of the standing doctrine in non-taxpayer establishment clause actions. The
court's decision represents an example of a logical and constitutionally sound
clarification of establishment clause standing.
WILLIA1M TURBEVILLE

INSURANCE: DOES FLORIDA'S NO-FAULT LAW
COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS?
Chapman v. Dillon, 415 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982)
Appellees brought a tort action seeking damages for pain and suffering
resulting from serious, nonpermanent personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision.1 The trial judge found Florida's no-fault statute 2 constitutional and dismissed the suit 3 because plaintiff's injuries did not meet the
statutory threshold for such a tort action.4 Reversing the trial court, the Fifth
between himself and the other party to the action, but to establish a point of law. See City
of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal. 2d 685, 693-94, 140 P.2d 666, 670 (1943).
64. 678 F.2d at 1389.
65. Public interest organizations can bring suits of a collusive nature where a properly
injured plaintiff is found. Note that one of the campers in the instant case is also a member
of the ACLU. Id. at 1384.
1. 415 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982). Appellee, Dennis Dillon, Jr., sought damages from appellants,
Chapman & Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., alleging that the automobile accident was caused
by Frederick Chapman's negligence. Id.
2. The statute referred to, the "Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act," is the 1979
revision. FiA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1979).
3. 415 So. 2d at 14.
4. FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (1979) delineates the threshold:
In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant
of a motor vehicle ... or against any person or organization legally responsible for his
acts or omissions, a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental
anguish, and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of such motor vehicle only in the
event that the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of:
(a) Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function.
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District Court of Appeal ruled the statute unconstitutional because it infringed upon the right of access to the courts5 without providing an adequate
substitute. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed and HELD, the
no-fault statute provides a reasonable alternative to a tort action since it
7
guarantees injured parties prompt payment for most expenses.
Florida enacted its no-fault law to alleviate excessive costs, delays and inequities inherent in the fault based insurance system.8 The legislature sought
to reduce automobile insurance premiums, decrease court congestion and assure
prompt payment for monetary losses.0 The initial act authorized personal injury
protection up to $5,000 for all medical expenses and disability losses.10 Disability payments for non-taxable income, however, were limited to eighty-five
percent.'1 The amount deductible for personal injury benefits was limited
to $1,000.12 Moreover, the statute granted limited immunity from suits for
personal injury damages when personal injury protection covered the victim's
losses .3 The law permitted a tort action for pain and suffering only if certain
threshold requirements were met,' 4 specifically permanent injury or disfigure(b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other
than scarring or disfigurement.
(c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement.
(d) Death.
5. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. "The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any
injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Id. See also New
York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (requiring an "adequate substitute remedy"
for an abolished cause of action).
6. Dillon v. Chapman, 404 So. 2d 354, 356 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981), rev'd, 415 So. 2d
12 (Fla. 1982). The court reasoned that the large deductible and only partial disability payments in the 1979 no-fault statute do not guarantee the motorist full compensation, thus
forcing injured motorists into court with concomitant delays. 404 So. 2d at 357.
7. 415 So. 2d at 17.
8. See Note, No-Fault Auto Insurance: Is EliminatingPain and Suffering a Viable Option
Under the Florida Constitution?,30 U. FLA. L. REV. 445, 445-46 (1978). See also R. K.ETON &
J. O'CONNE.L, BAsic PROTEaON FOR THE TRA"Fic VICnm 11-75 (1965), where the authors

emphasize the practical problems with fault-based insurance and recommend a no-fault system
as reform legislation.
9. See GiUespie &MacKay, Florida'sNo-Fault Insurance Law, 45 FLA. B.J. 400, 402 (1971)
(summary of new insurance law by members of the Florida House of Representatives);
O'Malley, Is No-Fault Insurance Best For Florida?, 45 FLA. B.J. 187, 190 (1971)

(Florida

Insurance Commissioner discusses reasons behind his no-fault proposal). Several years later,
one commentator statistically reviewed the no-fault system and found positive effects. The
time required to receive benefits was measurably reduced and settlement amounts conformed
more closely to verified damages. See Little, No-Fault Auto Reparationin Florida:An Empirical
Examination of Some of Its Effects, 9 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 1 (1975).

10. 1971 Fla. Laws 252 § 7(1)(a), (b) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1)(a), (b) (1971).
11. Id. § 7(1)(b) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.73(1)(b) (1971)).
12. Id. § 10 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.739 (1971)). The policyholder waived all rights
to claim or recover the elected deductible amount from the person or organization legally responsible for the accident. Id.
13. Id. § 8(l) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.737(1) (1981)). The motorist with personal
injury protection was exempted from tort liability for damages because of personal injury
to the extent that benefits were payable or would be payable but for a deductible. The
policyholder would be liable for intangible damages if the tort threshold were met. Id.
14. Id. § 8(2) (codified at FI. STAT. § 627.737(2) (1971)). A plaintiff who met the threshold
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ment, death, or any harm resulting in medical expenses over $1,O000.1 The
initial act also contained a no-fault provision for property damage. 16
In the landmark case of Kluger v. White,17 the Supreme Court of Florida
ruled the property damage provision of the no-fault law unconstitutional because it abolished guaranteed court access without providing an adequate
substitute or showing public necessity.8 Applying the reasonable alternative
test, the Kluger court found the no-fault provision an inadequate, and, therefore, unconstitutional alternative to a tort action. 19 The court commented that
an adequate alternative would have been provided had the no-fault provision
required property damage coverage, thus ensuring prompt payment for these
losses. 20 Because the issue in Kluger was limited to property damage insurance,
the constitutionality of the statute's personal injury provision remained unclear. 21
Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 22 however, affirmed the constitutionality
of personal injury no-fault insurance.23 With one exception,24 the personal
requirements could recover damages for "pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience
Id.
because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease.
15. Id.
16. Id. § 9 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.738 (1971)).
17. 281 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1973). Appellant had no recourse for property damage to her
automobile caused by another driver's alleged negligence because she had not purchased
property damage insurance. Further, she did not meet the property damage minimum of $550,
which was calculated according to fair market value rather than damages. Id. at 3.
18. Id. at 4. The Kluger court distinguished other statutes that diminish access to court
rights. The court contrasted workers' compensation, reasoning it provided a sufficient, and
even preferable, substitute for the right to sue one's employer in a work-related accident.
Id. See FLA. STAT. §440.10 (1971). As to the Guest Statute, the court noted it did not
abolish tort action, but rather increased the required degree of care. 281 So. 2d at 4. See
McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334. 340, 5 So. 2d 867, 870 (1942). The court analogized the nofault law to other examples of public necessity. It observed that rights to sue for alienation
of affections, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of promise were relinquished because such suits were used for extortion and blackmail. 281 So. 2d at 4. See Rotwein v. Gersten,
160 Fla. 736, 789, 36 So. 2d 419, 421 (1948).
19. 281 So. 2d at 8. The reasonable alternative concept was introduced in New York
Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917), which upheld workers' compensation. The
Supreme Court stated: "[I]t perhaps may be doubted whether the State could abolish all
rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, without setting up something
adequate in their stead." Id.
20. 281 So. 2d at 5.
21. Id. at 2. Two years before the present case, two Florida legislators also expressed
doubts regarding constitutional issues. See Gillespie & MacKay, supra note 9, at 402.
22. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974). Appellant brought an action for property and personal
injury damages incurred in an automobile collision. Id. at 12-18. Upholding Kluger, the court
ruled the property damage section invalid. Id. at 18.
23. Id. at 18, 15. Several other states have upheld the constitutionality of no-fault automobile insurance. See, e.g., Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976); Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974); Fann v.
McGuffey, 584 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975); Pinnick v. Cleary, 860 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592
(1971); Opinion of the Justices, 118 N.H. 205, 304 A.2d 881 (1973); Rybeck v. Rybeck, 141
N.J. Super. 481, 358 A.2d 828 (1976), cert. denied, 379 A.2d 261 (1977); Montgomery v. Daniels,
38 N.Y.2d 41, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 340 N.E.2d 444 (1975).
24. The court held unconstitutional the portion of FL.A. STAT. § 627.787(2) (1971), de-
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injury provisions in the no-fault statute were upheld 25 because they offered a
sufficient alternative to a traditional tort action.2 6 The court distinguished
Kluger by noting that that tort statute abolished all right of recovery for
property damage under a specified amount, but recovery of intangible harm
was denied for personal injury only when the threshold requirements were not
met.2 7 The court emphasized that personal injury security was compulsory,-

whereas property damage protection was optional.2 9 Under a quid pro quo
analysis, prompt recovery of major expenses and immunity from negligence was
considered a fair exchange for the waiver of tort action rights.30
The legislature made significant revisions in the no-fault act after the
Lasky case. The amended statute increased the personal injury protection
limit to $10,000,31 lowered recovery of medical benefits to eighty percent of

all reasonable expenses,3 2 and reduced the maximum disability payments. 3
Additionally, the maximum deductible was raised to $8,00034 so that motorists
covered by other benefit programs would not be over-insured.3, The tort
threshold was restricted to permanent injuries, permanent disfigurement or
death.3 6 As a result of these modifications, the validity of the no-fault statute
again became uncertain. 7
scribing the tort threshold as including "the fracture of a weight-bearing bone or the compound, comminuted, displaced or compressed fracture." 296 So. 2d at 21.
25. 296 So. 2d at 15. The court also held the statute complied with due process because
it had "a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective and [was] not discriminatory, arbitrary or oppressive." Id. at 15, 17.
26. Id. Accord Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 292-94, 363 A.2d 1, 14-15 (1975)
(applied reasonable alternative standard in upholding no-fault). Cf. Fann v. McGuffey, 534
S.V.2d 770, 776 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975) (affirmed no-fault based on implied consent theory).
27. 296 So. 2d at 15.
28. FLA. STAT. § 627.733 (1971).
29. 296 So. 2d at 14.
30. Id. at 15. The court commented that the accident victim received immunity from
liability for the intangible damages of the other parties if they failed to meet the threshold.
Id. Accord Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 293, 363 A.2d 1, 15 (1975) (no-fault statute
aided policyholders by exempting them from tort liability in certain circumstances); Pinnick
v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 23, 271 N.E.2d 592, 606-07 (1971) (consideration of no-fault benefits
to motorists as plaintiffs and as defendants).
31. 1978 Fla. Laws 374, § 3 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (1981)).
32. 1977 Fla. Laws 468, § 33 (codified at FLA. STAT. 627.736(I)(a) (1981)).
33. Id.

34. 1978 Fla. Laws 374, § 6(l) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.739(1) (1981)). But see 1982
Fla. Laws 243, § 557 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.739(2) (Supp. 1982)) (lowering deductible
to $2,000.00).
35. The statute stated insurers should offer the authorized deductibles to applicants or
policyholders; however, the amount of the deductible is not recoverable if the defendant has
attained the no-fault tort immunity. See FLA. STAT. § 627.739(1) (1979), as amended by 1982
Fla. Laws 243, § 557 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.739(1) (Supp. 1982)).
36. 1978 Fla. Laws 374, § 4 (codified at FLA. STAT. §627.737(2) (1981)). In Faulkner v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 367 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1979), the court expanded the tort threshold meaning.
In Faullner,plaintiffs argued a spouse's loss of consortium action cannot be barred by the
other spouse's failure to meet the tort threshold. The court disagreed, noting loss of consortium is a derivative action. Since the claim from which it derived was barred, then the
loss of consortium action was barred. Id. at 217. Distinguishing Kluger, the court said that
the spouse's claim was not abolished, but instead was limited for public policy reasons. Id.
37. For a discussion of the constitutional impact on the revised statute, see Levin, Visiting
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The instant case reaffirmed the constitutionality of the reduced recovery of
medical expenses and disability losses in the revised no-fault statute.38 The
court reasoned Lasky required prompt compensation to injured parties for
their major and salient monetary damages, but not for all of their economic
losses.3 9 The instant decision maintained that these lower personal injury
benefits would not reduce compensation because many drivers were protected
by other private or governmental benefit systems. 40 The majority further
recognized the need for an $8,000 deductible to prevent duplicate coverage
41
due to the purchase by policyholders with collateral sources.
Appellee's claim that the restricted tort threshold denied access to the
courts for recovery of intangible damages was not specifically addressed. 42 The
court instead impliedly upheld the revision by approving the Lasky holding
that speedy recovery of major losses is a reasonable alternative to traditional
tort rights.

43

The court further noted that the increase in personal injury

protection limits from $5,000 to $10,000 would provide additional protection
for motorists. 44 In his dissent, Justice Sundberg cited Kluger and concluded
that the revised statutory tort threshold was unconstitutional because it completely denied accident victims their tort action right to recover intangible
damages for nonpermanent injuries.4 5 Justice Sundberg further cautioned that
the decreased medical and disability protection approached the outer limits
of constitutional validity, but deferred to legislative judgment in such a close
46
case.
Florida's No-Fault Experience: Is It Now Constitutional?, 54 FLA. B.J. 123 (1980). The
constitutionality of some of the new no-fault provisions was tested in Purdy v. Gulf Breeze
Enter., Inc., 403 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1981). The Purdy plaintiffs contended the statutory distinction between automobile-injured plaintiffs and other plaintiffs violated FLA. CONsT. art.
I, § 2, Florida's equal protection clause. The Purdy court found the classification did not violate
equal protection because it was reasonably related to legislative goals. 403 So. 2d at 1329.
38. The court upheld FLA. STAT. §§ 627.736(1), .737, .739 (1979). 415 So. 2d at 19. The
instant case also upheld the act on due process grounds, concluding the provision reasonably
related to the legislature's objective, which was to minimize Florida insurance costs. Id. at 18.
The court further maintained the law satisfied equal protection because it was reasonable,
non-arbitrary and treated all permanently injured persons alike. Id. at 18-19 (citing Lasky,
296 So. 2d at 19).
39. 415 So. 2d at 17. Relying on Lasky, the instant court determined full compensation
was not needed to pass the reasonable alternative test. Id.
40. Id. The court concluded that collateral benefits sufficiently covered expenses not
included in the personal injury protection provision. Id.
41. Id. The court-defined deductible objective was preventing car owners with collateral
insurance from paying duplicate coverage premiums. Defending the deductible, the court
presumed that policyholders selected such options with knowledge of the consequences. Id.
42. The majority did directly address the constitutionality of the revised statutory threshold in finding that the amended provision did not deny appellant equal protection of the
law. Id. at 18-19.
43. Id. at 17.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 19 (Sundberg, C.J., dissenting). Applying Kluger, Justice Sundberg concluded
FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) violates the due process requirements of FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 because if the legislature could abolish the right to intangible benefits for nonpermanent injuries, then it could also relinquish the right to damages for permanent injuries. Id.
46. Id. Justice Overton also wrote an opinion concurring with the majority's approval
of § 627.736(l)'s reduced personal injury compensation. Id. at 19 (Overton, J., concurring).
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The instant court relied heavily on Lasky's holding that the legislature may
deny access to courts only if a reasonable alternative is provided.47 The court's
opinion, however, failed to fully assess the reasonableness of the alternatives
left available under the amended no-fault statute. With these legislative revisions, the statute no longer guarantees payment of major expenses as Lasky
requires, and thereby denies the constitutional right of access to court. For
example, the court validated the reduced recovery of medical expenses and disability losses,48 finding that lower benefits would not result in reduced compensation since many policyholders are compensated through other benefit
systems. 4 9 While motorists have been increasing their protection with
collateral sources as the legislature has reduced the statutory protection, 50
collateral benefits are not mandatory in a no-fault system and a motorist lacking
such additional coverage may not be fully compensated. 51 Lasky's requirement
of prompt recovery for major losses becomes severely threatened when the percentage of recovery is decreased, particularly in certain cases where only a little
over half of the actual disability damages suffered are recoverable under nofault.5 2
The court also utilized the collateral benefits analysis in upholding the increased $8,000 deductible. A larger deductible limit reduces the duplicative
costs of no-fault insurance for motorists with collateral source insurance. 53 Because motorists otherwise insured must also purchase no-fault policies, they
54
must waive their tort rights without obtaining any new benefits in exchange.
The court failed to realize, however, that a no-fault statute allowing substantial
deductibles fails to provide a substitute remedy for tort action. 55 An injured
party must resort to the court system to claim damages not recovered due to a
high deductible. Motorists without collateral sources who make the statutorily
47. 415 So. 2d at 16-17.
48. Id. at 17. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (1979) which authorizes payment for 80% of medical
and 60% or 80% of disability losses, constitutes coverage for major and salient losses.
49. 415 So. 2d at 17.
50. Most of the motorists in Florida have other sources of protection for medical and
disability losses. Studies have shown that 907 of Floridians have medical insurance that
covers 88.2% of medical expenses arising from an accident. Further, it was found that 90%
of working Floridians have private disability income protection. Levin, supra note 37, at 124.
51. The district court opinion in Chapman stated that while an injured party may bring
suit for unrecovered expenses and lost income, many lawsuits will not be filed because of their

relatively small amounts. 404 So. 2d at 357.
52. See 1982 Fla. Laws 243, § 554 (codified at FLA.

STAT.

§ 627.736(l)(b) (Supp. 1982)) (re-

covery of non-taxable benefits limited to 60%). Recovery under the no-fault statute has been
even further reduced, as the legislature has subsequently modified the statute to pay 60% of
disability losses regardless of tax effects. Id. The revised section offers "[s]ixty percent of any
loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity.... Id.
53. See Levin; supra note 37, at 124. Since nine out of ten Floridians are insured with
collateral sources, they are required to purchase personal injury protection that covers the
same losses. Id.
54. Id. Moreover, they would receive no additional compensation for their purchase of a
no-fault policy because most insurers require a coordination of benefits clause in their
contracts. Coordination of benefits prohibits the accident victim from recovering more than
100% of his medical expenses. Id.
55. See Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 13-15. Such high deductibles effectively make personal injury
protection optional and therefore an inadequate substitute for a tort action.
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permissible choice of the maximum deductible are not assured prompt payment, or payment at all, for their major expenses, in clear contravention of
56
the Lasky holding.
The majority's analysis of the amended statute's restrictive tort threshold
similarly failed to address the impact of this provision on the constitutionally
guaranteed right to tort action. Under the original threshold, which permitted
tort actions for non-pecuniary losses if medical expenses exceeded $1,000, 57 the
limited class of accident victims not meeting the threshold was better compensated by prompt payment of its major monetary expenses. 58 The amended
statute eliminating this $1,000 medical threshold 9 abolishes any right to recover intangible damages for nonpermanent injuries.60 The innocent victim
who sustains severe, nonpermanent injuries thus has no legal remedy. 61
Perhaps the court's decision was based on the practical consideration that an
economically based medical threshold encourages injured parties to obtain
62
unnecessary medical services to reach the statutory minimum for a tort action.
Regardless of the potential for abuse, however, this elimination of rights
directly conflicts with the principles in Kluger supporting the constitutional
63
right of access to the courts or a reasonable alternative.
The instant case provided the court with an opportunity to reaffirm its
approval of no-fault insurance.4 Although the no-fault principle is equitable,65
56. See supra note 50. Recognizing the inequity of a large deductible, the legislature has
since reduced the deductible limit to $2,000. 1982 Fla. Laws 243, § 557 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 627.739(2) (Supp. 1982)).
57. FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (1971). Unfortunately, a monetary threshold is unavoidably
arbitrary in its determination of an optimal dollar figure. See Rybeck v. Rybeck, 141 N.J. Super.
481, 497, 358 A.2d 828, 837 (1976).
58. See Gentile v. Alterinatt, 169 Conn. 267, 293, 363 A.2d 1, 15 (1975). The Connecticut
Supreme Court commented that an injured party beneath a $400 threshold was better compensated by prompt payment for monetary losses. Id. This same principle may apply to
Florida, although the applicable threshold was $1,000,
59. 1976 Fla. Laws 266, § 5 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (1981)).
60. 415 So. 2d at 19 (Sundberg, J., dissenting). In effect, this type of threshold could bar
over 97% of accident victims from recovery of non-pecuniary damages. See Ring, The Fault
with "No-Fault", 49 NOTRE DAmsi, LAW. 796, 806 (1974). But see Nales v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1981). In this case, the court of appeal reversed
a trial judgment for the defendant based on plaintiff's failure to meet the tort threshold. The
court held punitive damages were recoverable in an automobile no-fault case, despite the
plaintiff's failure to meet the tort threshold. In so holding, the Nales court observed the nofault law must be strictly construed because it limited a common law action. Id. at 456.
61. 415 So. 2d at 19 (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
62. See Ring, supra note 60, at 806. In discussing the inequity of thresholds, the author
noted such provisions hurt the honest victim most severely. The threshold encourages unnecessary physicians' visits and hospital stays by unethical victims. Id.
63. Id. See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 3-4. In Kluger, the court invalidated that no-fault
property damage limit as a denial of the right of access to the courts. Justice Sundberg saw
the same fatality in the instant case, where the common law right to recovery for intangible
damages for nonpermanent injuries was abolished without provision for a substitute. 415
So. 2d at 19 (Sundberg, C.J., dissenting).
64. Since the instant case was decided, Florida district courts of appeal have ruled on
cases citing Chapman as authority. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Garcia, 417 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1982) (appellate court reversed trial court's failure to give a jury instruction
on the no-fault threshold); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Rifkin, 415 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 4th
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